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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH K. BRADFORD and
TAMMY BRADFORD, his wife,
PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
MICHAEL ALVEY and
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS,
a Partnership; and
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a
General Partner, d/b/a
MICRO INVESTMENT, a Utah
Limited Partnership,

Case No. 16829

DefendantsRespondents.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Bradford,
seek specific performance, or in the alternative, damages for the
breach of an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Purchase (Exhibit
1).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below granted judgment for the DefendantsRespondents Michael and Vaughn Alvey and Defendant-Respondent
Michael E. Crowley holding that a condition precedent to the
agreement becoming binding was never satisfied, a reasonable time

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for performance of the contract had passed, the Bradfords failed
to

reasonably

pursue

financing,

and

that no evidence was

introduced regarding damages at the time of breach.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Alveys, respondents, seek to have the trial court's
judgment affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Michael

and Vaughn Alvey

(hereinafter Alveys)

are

partners doing business as C. Howard Alvey and Sons, a general
partnership.
Vaughn Alvey.

(T.110).

Barney Alvey is the brother of Michael and

(T.110).

Barney Alvey is not in partnership with

his brothers, but is an employee of the partnerhip acting as
foreman of construction.

(T.111).

Pam Tazzer was an employee of

the partnership working as a secretary in the partnership's
business office.

(T.43,111).

Midvalley Investment is a corporation in the business of
selling real estate.

(T.110).

employed by Midvalley Investment.

Michael Herzog is a realtor
Midvalley's office is in the

same building as C. Howard Alvey and Sons' office, but these are
completely separate businesses, being on the first and second
floors of the building, respectively.

(T.42,43).

In February, 1978 the appellants telephoned Midvalley
Investment and spoke with Michael Herzog concerning their desire
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to purchase a house in the Shiloh subdivision in West Jordan,
Utah.

(T.32).

A few days after the appellants had telephoned

Midvalley, Herzog visited the appellants at their home.

At that

time the appellants signed an earnest money agreement wherein they
offered to purchase a house to be constructed in the Shiloh
subdivision.

(T.32), Exhibit 1.

At the appellants' request,

Herzog presented the offer to the Alveys.

(T.57,103.)

The Alveys

accepted the appellants' offer to purchase on or about February
22, 1978.

Exhibit 1.

a completion date;

The Earnest Money Agreement did not specify
it provided, however,

that the sale was

conditioned on the appellants' obtaining FHA financing.
1.

Exhibit

-

A few days after the appellants' offer to purchase had
been accepted, Herzog arranged a loan prequalif ication meeting
with American Home Mortgage.

(T.35).

No formal application for a

loan was made at that time and no loan commitment was ever issued
by American Home Mortgage.

{T.35).

The appellants did not make a formal application for an
FHA loan until March 12, 1979.

(T.5).

Even then, this FHA loan

application did not result in a commitment being issued because in
March, 1979 FHA loan application policies and procedures required
that the house be nearly complete before an FHA loan could be made.
(T.5,14).

However, if the application had been made at the time

the Earnest Money Agreement was entered, in February of 1978, an
FHA loan commitment good for six months could have been granted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- ") _

even though

the house was

construction.

(T.173-175).

just in the

initial

stages of

A conventional loan commitment was

eventually issued in July, 1979, long after this litigation had
been commenced, as a result of an application for a conventional
loan application made on June 25, 1979.

(T.5-6).

At no time between February, 1978 and March, 1979 did
the appellants demand that the Alveys complete the house and
tender performance.

(T.58).

In October, 1978 the appellants sold

the duplex they were living in and purchased another house with
the proceeds of the sale ($15,000).

(T.46,47,66,67).

About the first of April the appellants learned from
Michael Alvey that the Alveys had sold the Shiloh subdivision to
Michael E. Crowley, a respondent here.

(T.102).

The appellants

called Crowley who denied that he had any legal obligation to
perform on the Earnest Money Agreement.

(T. 53).

On April 30,

1979, the appellants initiated this action.
In May, 1979 the appellants borrowed $17,000 from one of
the appellants' parents.
at $275 a month.

The appellants are paying the money back

(T.48,49,63).

The testimony is conflicting as to

whether the money was a gift or a loan.

(T.48,49,62,63).

The

trial court believed the testimony that the $17,000 was a loan.
See Findings of Fact 1T5.

The conventional loan commitment

received in July, 1979, which was part of the appellants' alleged
tender of payment made that month (T.50, Exhibit 10), was invalid
and ineffective because the $17,000 was a loan.

(T.11).
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I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
THAT THE FAILURE OF APPELLANTS TO OBTAIN
FINANCING AFTER SEVENTEEN MONTHS WAS UNREASONABLE

A.

This is an Action at Law Because the Appellants are not Entitled to Specific Performance
Before the court reviews the complete record and passes

on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence based on the
appellants' claim that this is an equitable action for specific
performance, the court must determine whether the appellants would
be entitled to specific performance of the Earnest Money Agreement
if it were enforceable.

Otherwise the appellants could have what

is in reality an action in law for damages decided under the
expanded scope of review reserved for equity cases.

Utah's

Constitution expressly provides that " ... in cases at law the
•
appeal shall be on questions of law alone .... " Utah Const. Art.
VIII § 9.

Assuming the earnest money agreement were enforceable,
and it is not,

the appellants are not entitled to specific

performance because they are not now, nor were they ever able to
perform their part of the contract.
It is elementary that specific performance of a
contract will not be ordered unless the one who
seeks to enforce it has performed his part of
the contract or is able to perform and offers
to do so. Flitch v. Boyle, 89 P.2d 912 (Kan.
1939).
~
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Specific performance is properly denied where it appears that one
party to the agreed exchange will not be able to perform as agreed.
See Restatement of Contract §373.

Even where tender is excused,

specific performance will be denied when the party seeking specific
performance was never able to perform.

Suhre v. Busch, 120 S.W.2d

47 (Mo. 1938).
The appellants are not now ready and able to perform, nor
have they ever been.

The appellants

~ade

two separate applications

for loans for the purpose of trying to perform on the contract.
first application did not result in a loan commitment.

The

(T. 5).

Though the second application resulted in a commitment being made,
the trial court found that the loan commitment was "invalid,
unenforceable and of no effect."
The trial court 1 s
resulted

from

the

Findings of Fact •S.

finding that the loan commitment that

second

loan

application

was

"invalid,

unenforceable and of no effect". is fully supported by the evidence.
It was the uncontradicted testimony of A. Thompson Calder, regional
vice president of the lending institution that issued the loan
commitment on the second application,

that if the appellants had

listed the $17, 000 borrowed from the parents of appellant Mr.
Bradford's parents that the loan commitment would not have been
issued.

(T.13).

Mr. Calder also testified that the appellants,

having borrowed the $17,000 for the down payment would not have
,,.

qualified for a loan on the date of trial.
further testified,

(T.9).

Mr. Calder

again without contradiction, that the loan
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commitment that was granted would have been invalid if the $17,000
down payment had to be borrowed.

(T .11, 13, 14).

Al though

appellant Mr. Bradford's testimony was conflicting regarding the
circumstances under which he received the $17,000 from his parents,
the trial court obviously concluded that his earlier testimony that
the $17,000 was a loan was the more credible testimony.
of Fact 1f5.

See Finding

This court has generally left the question of a

witness's credibility to the trial judge because of trial judge's
advantaged position in being able to observe the demeanor of the
witness.

Grittens

~Lundberg,

3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 {1955).

Appellant Mr. Bradford testified as follows:
Q.
Is it true you .were asked in your
deposition . . . [where] you were to get the
money [and] from who[m] and isn't it true that
you answered ["]my parents["]?

A.

I guess.

Q. Is it also true that you were asked
["].was it a gift["] and you said in answer to
that question ["]no I"]. I guess I wouldn't
call it a gift.{"]
A.

That's correct.

Q. Weren't you also asked ["]did you have
to pay them back ["] and wasn't your answer
["]yes?["]
A.

I guess it was.

Q. And isn't it true that you were asked
how much of it they gave you exactly and isn't
it true you answered approximately $17,000?
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A.

Yes.

Q. Were you also asked ["]when did you
have to pay them back ["] and did you answer
[" ] I am paying them back monthly right now? [ "]
A.

Yes.

Q. And were you asked ["]how much["] and
did you answer ["]$275?["]
A.

Yes.

Q.
Isn't it true that you did not tell
Mason McDuf fy or their representative you had a
debt to your parents in the amount of $17,000?

A. That is true. I didn't tell them. (T.
62, 63). (Quotation marks added for clarity.)
Appellant Mr. Bradford also testified that the appellants did
not have the cash to purchase the house, and that he was not ready
or able to perform his obligations under the Earnest Money
Agreement at anytime between October, 1978 and May, 1979. (T. 6769).

Furthermore, even if the contract had been repudiated,
the appellants

are not entitled to specific performance.

A

seller's repudiation of a contract does not excuse a purchaser who
seeks specific performance of the contract from pleading and
proving that he is ready, willing, and able to perform his
obligations under the contract.
1977).

Gaffi ~Burns, 563 P.2d 726 (Ore.

The court in Gaffi, supra, rejected the buyer's contention

that where the buyer had failed to show at trial that they were
"ready and able" to perform under the contract that specific
performance

should be granted conditioned on payment of the

contract price within a specified time.
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B.

..

The Trial Court's Judgment Must be Sustained
If Supported by Substantial Evidence
The appellants' action is not an action in equity, but an

action at law for damages.

Accordingly, the court's review of the

evidence is limited to determining whether it is sufficient to
sustain the judgment.
984 (1948).

Penman

Jackson~

Y..:_

Emico Corp., 114 Utah 16, 196 P.2d

Jackson, 113 Utah 249, 192 P.2d 397 (1948).

In cases at law the court "will not redetermine facts
found by the fact finder in the lower court . . . if in the light
most favorable to the respondent the evidence is sufficient to
sustain such findings."
172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953).

Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah
The evidence is sufficient to sustain a

judgment if there is substantial evidence from which reasonable
minds would believe facts which will support the judgment.

Land v.

Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 376, 351 P.2d 952 (1960).

The

evidence may be substantial enough to support the judgment even
though it is less than a preponderance of the evidence.
~Finch,

See Marker

322 F.Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1971).
However, even were this an equitable action this court

has recognized that it should not reverse a case just because it may
have decided the matter differently on the facts.
Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 {1972).

See Del

Porto~

There is a presumption

that the trial court's findings and judgment are correct even in
equity cases.

Id.

In McBride

Y.!_

McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah

1978}, this court said that!
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While ~t is the responsibility of this court
t~ review ~he evidence in equity cases, it
will not disturb the findings of fact made
below unless they appear to be clearly
er1:"oneous and against the weight of the
evidence. In conducting our review of the
evidence we are mindful of the advantaged
position of the trial judge who sees and hears
the witnesses and we are contrained to give
due deference to his decisions by reason
thereof. (footnote omitted).
This court has specifically held that in actions for
specific performance the evidence is reviewed in the light most
favorable to the findings and that the findings will not be
disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them.
Cook~

C.

Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963).

The Trial Court's Judgment is Supported by
the Preponderance of the Evidence.
The law is not in dispute in this case.

Before a binding,

enforceable contract ever comes into existence all conditions
precedent to performance must be satisfied.

Where, as here, the

Earnest Money Agreement does not specify the time in which the
financing must be obtained or the time in which the parties must
perform, the law will imply that a reasonable time was contemplated
in each instance.

Commercial Security Bank ~ Johnson, 10 Utah

342, 173 P.2d 277 (1946}.

The law also implies in cases like this

where the agreement for the sale of real property is expressly made
subject to the buyer obtaining financing the buyer makes a promise
implied in law to use

reasonable diligence to procure such
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financing.

Sorenson v.

Connelly, 536 P. 2d 328 (Colo.

197 5);

Anaheim Co. Y!.. Holcombe, 426 P.2d 713 (Ore. 1967); "Sufficiency of
Real Estate Buyer's Efforts to Secure Financing Upon Which Sale is
Contingent," 78 A.L.R. 3d 880.
1.

Because the Appellants Have Failed to Urge
Error As To Alternative Findings Which
Justify the Judgment Below, That Judgment
Must Be Affirmed

The following issues were raised at trial:

(1) did the

appellants obtain FHA fina_ncing so as to satisfy the condition
precedent to either parties obligation to perform; (2)

did the

appellants obtain financing within a reasonable time after the
contract was entered; and (3) did the appellants use reasonable
diligence in obtaining financing.
decided against the appellants.
of law

~~2,4.

At trial all these issues were

Findings of Fact '10; Conclusions

If the answers to any of the above questions is in

the negative the trial court's judgment must be affirmed.

The

appellants choose only to raise and argue the last question.
Appellants'

Docketing System '5;

Appellants Brief.

Where a

question is not urged in the printed brief on appeal, the question
is deemed to have been decided properly below.
116 Utah 465, 211 P.2d 206 (1949).

Reid v. Anderson,

If the trial court's judgment

may be sustained on grounds not urged on appeal the trial court's
judgment must be affirmed without considering the errors urged on
appeal.
affirmed.

Id.

Accordingly,

judgment for

the Alveys must be

In any event, the trial court's findings on all the
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issues are supported by the preponde:rance of the evidence andjudgment must be affirmed on appeal.
2.

The Trial Court's Finding That The
Appellants Failed to Satisfy the
Condition Precedent to Performance is
Supported by a Preponderance of the
Evidence.

The performance of the Earnest Money Agreement by either
the appellants or the Alveys was conditioned on the appellants
obtaining FHA financing.

Exhibit 1.

The appellant did apply for

FHA financing but no FHA loan commitment was ever issued.

(T.5).

The appellants did obtain a conventional loan commitment.

This,

however, did not satisfy the condition precedent which required FHA
financing.

Moreover, as already discussed, the court properly

found

this conventional loan commitment to be invalid,

that

unenforceable and of no effect.

Therefore, the appellants failed

to satisfy a condition precedent essential to the formation of an
enforceable contract, and there is no contract to be breached or
enforced.

3.

The Trial Court's Finding That a
Reasonable Time for Performance of
the Contract had Passed is Supported
by the Preponderance of the Evidence.

A reasonable time for performance of a contract is
determined by ascertaining the intention of the parties'

as

determined from the facts and circumstances at the time the
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contract was entered.
(Kans. 197 6) ; Martins

See
~

Stewart~

Cunningham, 548 P.2d 740, 745

Franklin, 462 P. 2d 853 (Ariz. 1969).

At

the time the contract was entered it seems obvious that neither
party intended to be bound by the earnest money agreement after the
lapse of seventeen months.
(T .155).

three months.

Normally a house can be built in about
At the inception of the contract the

appellants did not expect to be bound by the contract if the Alveys
had

failed

to perform after seventeen months had elapsed.

Moreover, at today's rates of inflation no builder would intend to
be bound by a seventeen month old contract price.

Since the

condition precedent to performance was not satisfied within a
reasonable time for performing the contract, and since neither
party to the contract pe.rformed within a reasonable time, the
contract expired and both parties are excused from performing.
Gullory Corp.

4.

Y.:_

See

Dussin Investment Co., 536 P.2d 501 (Ore. 1975).

The Trial Court's Finding That the
Appellants Failed to Use Reasonable
Diligence in Obtaining Financing is
Supported by the Preponderance of the
Evidence.

The trial court's findings that a reasonable time had
passed for performance of the contract, and that the appellants
failed· to use reasonable digiligence in obtaining financing are
supported by the preponderance of the evidence as demonstrated by
the record and the judgment below should be affirmed.
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The record shows that: at the time the Earnest Money
Agreement was entered FHA financing was available to the appellants
(T. 21-23, 173-175); the appellants never made an application for
an FHA loan, or any loan, until almost thirteen months after the
Earnest Money Agreement had been executed; (T. 21-23. 173-175);
that during the delay in making application for an FHA loan in
satisfaction of the condition precedent to performance on the
contract, FHA loan

proce~ures

were changed so that the appellants

could no longer obtain an FHA loan prior to one hundred percent
completion of the house (T.5, 14, 21); the appellants never did
receive an FHA loan (T .14); the usual practice in the housing trade
is for the buyer to obtain financing before the home is completed
(T.184); the usual practice in the housing trade is for buyers to
make written application for a loan a few· days after the earnest
money agreement is executed (T.181); the uncontradicted testimony
of a builder, a real estate broker, and a mortgage lender was that a··
reasonable time for a buyer to obtain financing would not exceed
ninety days from the date of the earnest money agreement (T.147,
181,

184);

and

finally,

the

appellants

did

not

obtain

a

conventional loan commitment until seventeen months after the
Earnest Money Agreement was entered and then that financing
commitment was invalid..
twelve and

ten months

unreasonable.

Courts have held delays of less than
in the exercise of option agreements

Mossir v. Cyrus, 119 P. 485 (Ore. 1911); Stone

Harmon, 19 N.W. 8 (Minn. 1894).
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Y..:..

Also relevant on the issue of reasonable diligence, are
the burdens placed on the Alveys by the appellants' delay in
obtaining financing.

As was testified to by Michael Alvey, his

company had begun the house in question on a speculation basis,
using limited speculation funds.

(T .133).

Until financing was

obtained by the appellants, the Alveys had to count this house as
one of their speculation houses and could not begin in its place
another speculation house with speculation financing.

(T .132).

The Alveys understood, in accord with the usual practice, that they
did not have to complete the home until the appellants had obtained
financing (T.144).

If the Alveys completed the home before they

were assured that the appellants had financing, they would have
risked creating serious cash flow problems and being left with a
custom home that was unmarketable because it may not have conformed
to normal buyer preferences in housing.

(T .104 ,141).

The appellants place great emphasis on the reason for
their failure to obtain financing as was their responsibility under
the Earnest Money Agreement.

The reason given is, in short, that

they were aware that the house was not yet completed.

The fact that

the house was not completed is not justification for the delay
given the sound general practice in the housing trade that the
buyer obtain financing prior to completion to alleviate the great
risks born by the builder if he completes the house prior to the
time the buyer has obtained

financing,

and the sale fails·

Furthermore, under the FHA loan procedure in effect at the time the
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Earnest Money Agreement was entered, and under conventional loan
procedures then and now, a loan commitment can be obtained prior to
completion of the house that will remain good during the time it
normally takes to complete the home.

(T.15, 142, 175).

Therefore,

the court should imply a duty on the buyers part to obtain financing
before the house is completed where obtaining financing is a
condition precedent to performance for the protection of the.
builder.

This results in no prejudice to the buyer whatsoever.

II.

THE EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS
OF MR. HERZOG IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR

A.

The Trial Court's Exclusion of Testimony
Is not Reversible Err Because the Appellants
Failed to Make the Required Off er of Proof
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly provides

that:
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside,
nor shall the judgment or decision based
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears of
record that the proponent of the evidence
either made known the substance of the evidence
in a form and by a method approved by the
judge, or indicated the ~ubst<:1nc~ o~ the
expected evidence by questions 1ndic.ati.ng the
desired answers, and (b} the court which passes
upon the effect or-the error or ~rrors is of
the opinion that the excluded evidence would
probably have had a substantia~ influe~ce.in
bringing about a different verdict or finding.
(Emphasis added.)
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The appellants fail to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule -5
with respect to the testimony they claim was excluded by error.
From an examination of the record, anyone can see that
the appellants never made known the substance of the excluded
evidence by either method approved by the judge or by questions
indicating desired answers.

(T.32-33, 35).

The transcript shows

that Mr. Bradford was asked:

Q. Were the terms of that earnest money
receipt discussed at the time with Mr. Herzog?
A.

Yes, it was.

Q.
And referring to line 21 of that
agreement, will you read that?

A.
Says subject
financing, FHA.

to

buyer

obtaining

Q. How did that come to be placed in the
agreement?
33).

A.

Mike Herzog told us that . . . . (T.32-

At that point an objection was made and sustained.

No proffer of

the substance of the testimonies was made, nor did the appellant
seek to have the hearsay statement admitted for other than the
truth of the matter asserted.
Subsequently, Mr. Bradford was asked:

Q. Did you ever get a loan commitment
form from American Home Mortgage?
A.

No, we did not.
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Q.

--

Why not?

A. We were told at the pre-qualification .
. (T.35).
At this point an objection was made and sustained.

No proffer of

the substance of the hearsay statements were made, nor did the
appellants seek to have the hearsay statements admitted for other
than the truth of the matter asserted.

The record in this instance

does not even disclose who had made the hearsay statments.

Also,

the statement is properly excluded for lack of foundation.
The appellants assert that in this situation proffer of
the substance of the evidence was unnecessary notwithstanding the
explicit requirement of Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

appellant cites In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908)
as support for their position.

Initially it should be noted that in

re Young's Estate was decided before Utah's adoption of Rule 5 of
the .Utah Rules of Evidence.

The court in In re Young's Estate:

supra, subscribed to the general rule that adequate proffers of
proof are required before an error based on the improper exclusion
of evidence can be appealed.

The court, however, in that case found

an exception to the general rule on the narrow ground that an
adequate offer of proof could not have been made under the
circumstances.

The exception to the proffer rule found in In re

Young's Estate is certainly not applicable here.
The appellant also cites several cases

from other

jurisdictions for the proposition that " [a ]n offer of proof is
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unnecessary where the nature of the error is otherwise clear.,,Appellants' Brief p. 23.

These cases are irrelevant because Rule 5

of the Utah Rules of Evidence is controlling and determinative.
See also Downey State
(Utah 1978).

Bank~

Mayor-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286

Furthermore, as is discussed below, the evidence does

not show that the realtor, Herzog, was Alvey's agent for purposes
of the statements made by Herzog that are claimed to have been
excluded by error.

Hence, it was not, and is not, clear that the

excluded hearsay statements were improperly excluded, and an offer
of proof is required before such an alleged error can be reviewed on
appeal even under the rule the appellants advocate.
In Denver Decorators, Inc.

~Twin

Teepee Lodge, Inc ..

431 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1967), the appellant there had sought at trial to
question a witness on a conversation which the witness had had with
a real tor.

The testimony was objected to and excluded on the ground

that there was an insufficient showing of agency relationship
between the realtor and the respondent.

No offer of proof was made.

The court on appeal concluded that:
In this particular circumstance, there having
been made no offer of proof, we would not be
justified in reversing judgment even if the
trial court committed technical error in
excluding this line of testimony. Id. at 10.
Appellants, again relying on authority from other jurisdictions for support, argue that the proffer was excused because a
prof fer of evidence is unnecessary where the court excludes an
entire class of evidence.

Appellants' Brief p. 23.

Rule 5 of the
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Utah Rules of Evidence makes the applicability of this principle in
Utah questionable at best.

In any event, the appellants have

misapplied the rule in this instance.

The trial judge in this case

did not make a sweeping ruling in this case excluding all evidence
on a theory or issue as was the case in Costa

~

Regents of

University of California, 254 P.2d 85 (Cal.App. 1953) and Lawlers
Y..:_

Calaway, 147 P. 2d 604 (Cal. 1944).

The trial judge in this

instance excluded testimony based on specific questions and
specific objections.

The appellants were free after the rulings

excluding the testimony to admit any evidence they had on any
relevant issue in the case, including the agency issue, so long as
the evidence was not excluded by some rule of evidence.
Moreover, where, as here, the testimony is excluded on
hearsay grounds and the proponent of the testimony fails to argue
at trial the theory that the evidence was offered to show state of
mind rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, he may not on
appeal claim that it was error to exclude the evidence on that
theory.

See Northern State Construction Co. ~Robbins, 457 P.2d

187 (Wash. 1969}.
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B.

The Excluded Testimony was not Admissible On
the Theory that Herzog was the Alveys' Agent or
that he was Authorized to Speak For the Alveys

1.

Herzog was not the Alveys' agent Merely
because they listed their Property for
sale with him

The fact that the Alveys were officers in Midvalley is
irelevant for purposes of determining whether Midvalley and Herzog
were actual agents

for

the Alveys because no evidence was

introduced to show that Midvalley was the Alveys' alter ego.

An

agency relationship results from the manifestation of consent by
one person that another shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, with a corresponding manifestation of consent by one
person that another shall act on his behalf and under his control.
State

~

Superior. Court, In and For Pinia County, 586 P.2d 1313

(Ariz. 1978); Moss

Y.:_

Vadman, 463 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1969}.

Whether

one is the agent of another depends upon the right of control by one
over the other.

Fox

~

Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936).

There is no evidence in the record showing that the Alveys, in their
capacity as sellers, had the right to control Herzog's actions or
the methods by which he obtained purchasers for the Alveys'
property.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that either the Alveys

or Herzog made the manifestations of consent necessary to the
creation of an agency relationship.
The appellants' contend that the existence of a sellerrealtor relationship between the Alveys and Midvalley is sufficient
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to make the realtor, Mr. Herzog, the agent of the seller, the
Alveys, for purposes of making representations.

None of the cases

relied upon by the appellants, however, directly support this
position.
A real estate broker does not have general authority to
act for the seller.
real

estate

broker

Martin~

is

Vincent, 593 P.2d 45 (Mont. 1979).

ordinarily

authorized only to find a purchaser.

A

an independent contractor
Stiles

~Edwards,

53 S.E.2d

697 (Ga. App. 1949); aff'd, 58 S.E.2d 260; see Friedman v. New York
Telephone Co., 176 N.E. 543 (N.Y. 1931).

In the absence of an

express agency granting a real estate agent greater authority, the
authority implied from the listing of property with a real estate
agent is that of a special agent with limited powers.
Thrush, 219 P.2d 977 (Wash. 1977).

Stevenson v.

A real estate agent has no

authority to make representations on behalf of a seller in the
absence of a showing of actual authority.

Stevenson, supra;

Stiles, supra.
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, the original
Earnest Money Agreement was not entered into with the real tor
acting on behalf of the Alveys.

The realtor, Herzog, prepared the

earnest money agreement in the form of an offer.

The offer was

signed by the appellants and at their request presented to the
Alveys.

(T.57).

The Earnest Money Agreement was not a contract

until the Alveys had accepted the appellants' offer.

Exhibit 1.

The record shows that Herzog was acting as the appellants' agent
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when he prepared the offer and submitted it to the Alveys for thelr
acceptance.

(T. 57, 103).

Appellant Mr. Bradford testified as

follows:
Q.
(By Mr. Feil) Did you ask him to
present this earnest money off er on your behalf
to the Alveys?
A.

Yes.

Q. And do you know if he presented the
offer to the Alveys on your behalf?
A.

As far as I know he did, yes.

Q. And brought it back to you saying he
had done what you asked him to do?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the off er had been accepted?

A.

Yes.

(T.57).

Appellant Mrs. Bradford testified as follows:

Q. Mrs. Bradford, is it true that Mike
Herzog acted as your agent, who actually
prepared the Earnest Money for you; that's
Plaintiff's Exhibit l?
A.

Yes.

Moreover, whatever implied special agency existed between
the Alveys and Herzog ended when the contract was accepted by the
Alveys because a realtor's authority is limited to finding a
purchaser.

The testimony that the appellants' claim was improperly

excluded related to conversations had after the Earnest Money
Agreement had been accepted, and after any agency relation that may
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have existed between the Alveys and the realtor, Herzog, had come
to an end.

(T.35).

Appellants' Brief p 3.

Where, as here, the

realtor has no authority to make the sale binding, the appellants
were bound to know the extent of the realtors authority.

Friedman,

supra.

2.

The Alveys made no representations
that would justify a finding of
agency by estoppel.

Appellants argue

that Herzog was Alveys'

agent by

application of the doctrine of agency by estoppel.

The acts

creating an agency by estoppel must be performed by the principal
with knowledge or a reasonable ground for believing that the other
party will rely thereon and -change his position for the worst.
Phoenix Western Holding Corp.
1972).

~

Gleeson, 500 P. 2d 320 (Ariz.

The statements or acts of the alleged agent will not

establish an agency by estoppel.

Rivett v. Nelson, 322 P.2d 515

(Cal. 1958).
None of the facts upon which the appellants rely to show
agency by estoppel are statements or acts made by the Alveys.

The

appellants repeatedly testified that they had no contact with the
Alveys, so no statements by them could have lead appellants to
believe that Herzog was acting as their agent.

(T.64, 82, 105).

The core of the appellants' agency by estoppel argument
is that the Alveys were officers of Midvalley Investment.

That

fact alone is not sufficient to establish an agency by estoppel.
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Moreover, while the appellants knew at the time of trial that the
Alveys were officers of Midvalley, there is no evidence in the
record that at the time Herzog made representations to the Alveys
that they knew the Alveys had anything at all to do with Midvalley
Investment.

(T.34).

It is unlikely that they knew the Alveys were

officers in Midvalley at that time because Herzog's statements were
made only a few days after the Earnest Money Agreement was signed
(T.34) and before the appellants had even been to the offices of
Midvalley.

(T.36).
The fact that the Alveys' office was in the same building

as that of Midvalley is insignificant for two reasons:

(1)

the

offices were on different floors and clearly separate, and (2) the
appellants' first visit to the building was after the Herzog' s
statements as to financing had been made. (T.43).

The doctrine of

agency by estoppel should not be applied to statements made by the
purported

agent

before

the

alleged

representations or acts

establishing agency by estoppel have occurred.

Also, significant

as to whether the appellants were lead to believe that Herzog was
the Alveys' agent is their testimony indicating that at the time
the offer was made and accepted they believed that Herzog was
acting for them and not the Alveys.

(T.57, 103).
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3.

The excluded testimony is not
admissible under Rule 63 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence

The excluded testimony is inadmissible under either Rule
63(8)(a) or Rule 63(9)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because, as
discussed above, the statements made by Herzog were not authorized
by the Alveys nor was Herzog the Alveys' agent.

The appellants

repeatedly rely upon the fact that the Alveys never had personal
contact with the Bradfords as support for their position that
Herzog acted for the Alveys in advising the appellants with regard
to financing.

The Earnest Money Agreement defined the respective

obligations of the parties.
constructing the house.

The Alveys'

only obligation was

The Alveys never needed to contact the

appellants regarding the mechanics of obtaining financing, either
personally or through Herzog, because it was the appellants'
responsibility and duty to obtain financing.

Therefore, it does

not follow that because the Alveys never personally contacted the
appellants regarding the financing arrangements that Herzog must
have acted for the Alveys.
Rule 63 {9)(a) is inapplicable for the additional reason
that the judge did not find that Herzog was unavailable as a witness
and no evidence was introduced showing that he was unavailable.

If

the appellants had produced evidence of unavailability at trial the
Alveys could have countered it with evidence showing that Herzog
was

available.

The

showing of unavailablity was not made

unnecessary by the judge's ruling that Herzog was not the Alveys'
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agent.

The rule expressly requires that the judge find the hearsay

declarant unavailable as a witness before the hearsay exception is
applicable.
The evidence is inadmissible to show the appellants'
state of mind because their state of mind as induced by Herzog is
not relevant on the issue of failure to use due diligence to obtain
financing with respect to the Alveys.

The appellants owed the

Alveys a duty to use due diligence in obtaining financing.

The

representations of Herzog, made on his own and not for the Alveys,
do not affect that duty.

Furthermore,

the exclusion of the

testimony is harmless error because the weight of the evidence,
even with the ad.mission of the excluded testimony, still favors a
finding that the appellants failed to use reasonable diligence in
obtaining financing.

III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND.

A.

Evidence Admitted Without Objection That
Is Relevant to Another Issue in the Case,
Cannot be Used to Show that an Unpleaded
Issued was Tried by Implied Consent
Rule lS(b} of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure provides

that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the
express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated as
if they had been raised in

the pleadings.

The appellants'
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equitable estoppel claim does not fall within this rule.

--

The

Alveys did not expressly consent to try the issue of equitable
estoppel, and the issue was not tried by implied consent of the
parties.

The issue of equitable estoppel was not tried at all.

Though some evidence introduced relevant to other issues in the
case may have also been relevant to the issue of equitable
estoppel, the introduction of that evidence without objection did
not raise the issue of equitable estoppel so that it could be
considered to have been tried by the implied consent of the
parties.

National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co.

Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (1958).

~

In Thompson, supra,

certain evidence relating to the value of a building, was admitted
without objection at trial because it was relevant to the pleaded
issue of insurable interest.
issue.

On the pleadings there was no value

The appellant there argued that even though the pleadings

did not raise the issue of value, the trial·court could properly
pass on that issue under Rule lS(b).

In holding that it would have

been improper for the trial court to pass on the issue of value
because the issue had not been tried by the implied consent of the
parties, the court said:
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we
must not lose sight of the cardinal principle
that under our system of justice if an issue is
to be tried and a party's rights concluded with
respect thereto, he must have notice thereof
and an opportunity to meet it. Id. at 253
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Stated simply,

the

appellants'

motion to amend the-

pleadings to conform to the proof was properly denied because the
introduction of evidence relevant to issues already in the case may
not be used to show implied consent to trial of a new issue in the
absence of a clear indication that the evidence was introduced in
an attempt to raise a new issue.
Harvester

Credit~

Thompson, supra; International

East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1977)

(applying Rule lS(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
is nearly identical to Utah's Rule 15(b)).

B.

Whatever the Alveys' Intent was Prior to
March, 1979, they were Free to Cancel
the Agreement in April, 1979
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is of no aid to the

petitioners in this case.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel does

not apply to breach of promise as to future conduct.
Whitmore, 23 Utah 343, 65 P. 70 (1901);
573 (Cal. 1945).

Hosner~

Elliot v.

Skelly, 164 P.2d

Therefore, even if the Alveys would have been

estopped from canceling the contract on satisfaction of the
condition precedent (FHA financing} through March, 1979, they would
not be estopped from canceling the contract in April when no
confirmation of financing had been made and the appellants'
application for financing had actually been rejected.
No matter what the Alveys' intentions were in March,
1979, or what the appellants believed them to be, the Alveys were
free to cancel the contract prior to satisfaction of the condition
precedent, notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
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"The intent of a party, however positive and
fixed, concerning his future conduct with
respect to such a matter, is necessarily
uncertain as to its fulfillment, and must
depend upon contingencies and be subject to
change and modifications by subsequent events
and circumstances." Hosner, supra at 577
(quoting 21 CJS p. 1142.)
Also,

the

reasonableness of the appellants'

reliance on the

representations of lower level employees (Barney Alvey and Pam
Tazzer} and a realtor as to the validity of the contract with the
Alveys is certainly questionable.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE APPELLANTS FAILED
TO INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES AT
THE TIME OF BREACH
As previously discussed, the only remedy available to the
appellants is damages.

However, the appellants never introduced

any evidence on the value of the house at the time of breach -about April 1, 1979.

The expert testimony as to house's value was

all with respect to its value on or after August 11, 1979.
91).

(T.88,

The trial court specifically found that the appellants failed

to present any evidence regarding the value of the house at the time
of breach.

Findings of Fact ~12.

The measure of damages in a

contract action is the difference between the contract price and
the fair market value of the property at the time of breach.
Hardinger~ Till, 96 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1939}.

The appellants have

failed to establish, or even introduce evidence, essential to their
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recovery in this case.

1906).

See Woodhouse ~Powles, 86 P. 1063 (Wash.

Therefore, even if all the other issues were decided in the

appellants' favor, they would not be entitled to judgment.

v.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed for all or any
of the following reasons:

(1) the record provides substantial

support for the trial court's finding that the appellants failed to
use reasonable diligence in obtaining financing; (2} the record
supports the trial court's finding that a reasonable time had
passed for performance of the contract when in April, 1979
respondent Crowley told the appellants that the Earnest Money
Agreement was not binding; and (3) the record shows that the
appellants failed to satisfy a condition precedent to performance
on the contract so no enforceable contract even existed.
In addition, the appellants failed to introduce evidence at
trial proving their damages, as was their burden, having failed to
establish an essential element of their case at trial, they are not
entitled to have the judgment reversed on appeal.

Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
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1:1~
Respectfully submitted this µ'th day of May, 1980.

FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies each of the foregoing Brief
to be delivered to Grant A. Hurst, attorney for the appellants, 68
South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah; and to Ronald L.
Poulton, 9 Exchange Place, Suite 420, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

-1.E._

day of May, 1980.
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